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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze elements of continuity and change in the
administrative history of the Historical Sanctuary of Machu Picchu (HSM) over the last decade.
Design/methodology/approach – Based on a field study and of both qualitative and quantitative
data, the paper reconstructs changes in accounting and planning processes and discourses.
Findings – At the macro level, in the recent past Peru has gone through a process of modernization of
the State, moving to more transparent and accountable forms of public management that deeply
restructured the public sector. In parallel, the international community (particularly, UNESCO) has
urged the adoption of a comprehensive strategic management plan for the HSM. Common to these
pressures for change is a logic of efficiency, of rationalization and control of public expenditures and of
more effective public services. At the micro level, these two pressures for change are shaping both the
transformation of the accounting representation system and the managerial and planning practices in
Machu Picchu.
Originality/value – The paper focuses on a description of the institutional settings in order to make
sense of the multiple rationalities involved; second, a reconstruction of the underlying “business
model” of the main entity involved in the administration of Machu Picchu (in terms of internal
structure and scope, visitor performance, financial performances, human resources); and third, a focus
on the progressive introduction of master planning as a practice.
Keywords Peru, History, Cultural heritage, Tourism, Sustainable development,
Management of World Heritage sites, Management, Museum
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Much has been said and written about Machu Picchu from very many different
perspectives: its sensational discovery in 1911 by Hiram Bingham, its identity as one of
the most enigmatic ancient sites in the world, its inscription on the UNESCO World
Heritage List in 1983 and, more recently, its nomination as the seventh wonder of the
world. Further, Machu Picchu is caught between the explosion of tourists and the
exploitation of a site, between the protection of inestimable heritage and speculative
economic interests related to tourism – and will Machu Picchu be inserted in the
blacklist of heritage sites at risk?
This paper addresses the managerial dimension of Machu Picchu, its continuity
and change in recent decades. We are interested in unraveling the knotty
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/2044-1266.htm
Journal of Cultural Heritage
Management and Sustainable
Development
Vol. 1 No. 2, 2011
pp. 157-176
r Emerald Group Publishing Limited
2044-1266
DOI 10.1108/20441261111171701
Several people have been fundamental in allowing this paper to be completed. The authors
would like to thank especially Arch. Jorge Zegarra Balcazar, at that time INC-Cusco Director,
Fernando Astete, Director of the Historical Sanctuary of Machu Picchu, Arch. Jorge Prado Tisoc,
Chief of the International Cooperation Office of INC-Cusco, and the whole staff of INC-Cusco and
HSM for welcoming the authors and providing rich documentation on the institution during the
authors’ visit to Peru in 2008. Many thanks also to Roberto Chavez for his precious suggestions
for the research.
157
Managing
Machu Picchu
situation of managing a site that is highly visible, highly profitable, highly
discussed, and at the crossroad of multiple convergent and often conflicting interests.
We will do so by reading the situation from an organizational and administrative
perspective.
Machu Picchu represents an insightful case in the debate about the relationship
between the historical value of heritage and its commercial exploitation, which often
calls for by managerial approaches in similar entities (for a literature review see
Zan, 2006; Lusiani and Zan, 2010).
In particular, our analysis will focus on three main aspects: first, a description
of the institutional settings in order to make sense of the multiple rationalities
involved; second, a reconstruction of the underlying “business model” of the
main entity involved in the administration of Machu Picchu (in terms of internal
structure and scope, visitor performance, financial performances, human
resources); third, a focus on the progressive introduction of master planning as a
practice.
This paper is based on qualitative and quantitative information gathered during
two field visits as independent researchers (May 2007 and May-June 2008), including
30 in-depth interviews with administrative personnel of the Instituto Nacional de
Cultura del Cusco (INC-Cusco), and direct observations of meetings between a World
Bank delegation, local professionals, and City Mayors. In addition, it is based on
analysis of legislative documents; press articles; literature on Peru’s political/
administrative system; UNESCO, World Bank and ICOMOS reports on Machu Picchu;
and internal management plans.
2. Institutional settings: a situation of conflict
Positioning Machu Picchu in its overarching political, administrative, and institutional
context is an indispensable preliminary digression in order to capture specificities and
problems of the case.
The administrative/political context
A first issue regards the political/administrative context (for an overview see: The
World Bank, 2002, 2006; APEC, 2007; ICE, 2007). Since the preservation of cultural
heritage is one of the duties of the State and is carried out through the action of public
institutions, major transformations of the public sector have organizational
implications for cultural heritage preservation actions[1]. Here more than elsewhere,
this has meant a huge process of change in recent decades: the controversial era
under President Fujimori in the 1990s, and the transformation of the State related
to the recovery of the democratic system from the 2000s. There are very important
discontinuities in this history of political/administrative context: the overarching
project of “Modernizing the management of the State”[2] in the political agenda
of the last decade, had important technical changes associated with it such
as a major decentralization process in the public sector and the regularization of the
national public investment system, with important impacts on the management of
human resources. Given the space limitations in this paper we will focus on the
major implications of these overarching political and administrative changes
for understanding change in Machu Picchu (for further details see box 1 in the
virtual appendix, available on SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id¼ 1745322).
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The nature of Machu Picchu
The second issue in order to position Machu Picchu in its context has to do with its
delimitation. What we refer to when we speak about Machu Picchu is much more than
what is commonly perceived (Figure 1):
. Its area goes far beyond the delimitation of the Inca City. The Historical
Sanctuary of Machu Picchu (HSM or “the Sanctuary” hereinafter) has an area of
32,592 ha and a perimeter of 116 km.
. In addition, the monumental Inca City cannot be appreciated separately from the
natural environment in which it is embedded. From an historical perspective the
sacred meaning of the area is grounded in its profound relationship with the
surrounding natural dimension. HSM embodies the extended, transectoral
concept of cultural heritage, belonging to the historical/artistic/anthropological
sector as well as to the physical/biological/geological one. Indeed, in 1983 the
HSM was declared part of the world cultural and natural heritage by UNESCO
for the exceptional value of both dimensions.
. Moreover, and also in archaeological terms, Machu Picchu is much more than
just the Inca City everybody evokes, which is just one spot in a network of
archaeological sites diffused throughout the whole territory of the Sanctuary. To
give an idea, the archaeological heritage within the area of the HSM counts 196
archaeological sites divided into four macro-zones (Mountains, Inca trail, Sacred
Valley, Sacred River).
Institutional fragmentation: HSM as an arena of conflicts
If institutional fragmentation is a general phenomenon in Peru (Giugale et al., 2006,
pp. 27-8), the protected area of Machu Picchu provides a typical example of such a
situation, with serious potential conflicts. Little would be understood about managing
Machu Picchu if an analysis of the conflicting interests involved were not attempted.
Machu Picchu lies at the crossroad of multiple, often conflicting interests at a
variety of levels that need to be disentangled. First there is a direct, immediate conflict
of jurisdictions between two ministries. The double dimension of the Sanctuary
(natural and cultural) entails an overlapping of the jurisdictions of the Ministry of
Education with the INC on the one side; the Ministry of Agriculture with the
Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (Inrena) on the other one. Or, to put in different
words, the organizational boundaries of any specific entity do not coincide with the
area of the site.
Second, there is a further conflict of jurisdiction between institutions: INC and
Inrena on the one side and the local government on the other (the municipality of
Aguas Calientes, also known as Machu Picchu Pueblo). The area of the Sanctuary
roughly coincides also with the political-administrative jurisdiction of the local
government. The problem here lies in the typical difficult trade off between
preservation goals and the social, economic, territorial, and occupational nature of local
government interests. The conflict is sharp in this case in particular. Given the poverty
of the local population and the huge opportunity to “make money” in Machu Picchu
with tourism, the economic, even speculative, interests of the local government are
extremely high. It should be underlined that Machu Picchu is perhaps one of the richest
– most “profitable” – archaeological sites of the world (see Table I), where all visitors
spend at least US$150 per day (just think of the difference with Pompeii, where the
train costs about h2, and the ticket h10).
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Figure 1.
Map of the Historical
Sanctuary of Machu
Picchu (HSM)
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Aguas Calientes is a small city created 50 years ago in the valley beneath the Inca City
of Machu Picchu exclusively and explicitly to exploit the externalities of tourism. The
birth and growth of Aguas Calientes paralleled the establishment and the increase of
tourism; a mass of “immigrants” from all over Peru were attracted into the area by the
opportunity for easy, fast, and rentable investments. Private interests and speculation
are dominant in the municipality of Aguas Calientes and, in general, the local
government tends not to recognize the authority of INC or Inrena. The main problem is
the uncontrolled urban expansion and all the related effects (health problems, solid
waste management problems, pollution) in an area that not only lies within a protected
natural park and within a historical sanctuary, but is also endangered by
environmental threats (frequent floods and landslides, in particular) that have of
course become more severe under urban pressure.
The two institutions (INC-Cusco and Inrena) have formal juridical power and can
oppose municipal actions, but faced with these strong economic interests and
corruption the entities fail to effectively intervene. Actually, the whole Peruvian justice
system does not seem effective in defending cultural heritage (despite the rhetoric of
the legislation in this sector): State justice intervenes very slowly while illegitimate
buildings and activities have already expanded and become rooted (interview with the
chief of Inrena and Memorias de gestio´n 2003-2006).
Third, there may be some sort of cultural conflict between the indigenous
rationality and the rationality of international organizations (UNESCO in particular)
involved in the area, or between “local” and “global” administrative trends. In 1983 the
HSM was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO because of its outstanding
universal value. Being under special protection implies that the preservation,
conservation, and enhancement of the world heritage site – although primarily
conducted by the State through its institutions – are also executed in cooperation
and with the technical assistance of the international community (Articles 4 and 7 of
the UNESCO Convention). Since 1983 then UNESCO has undertaken a continuous
process of monitoring, assessing, and assisting all activities concerning the
preservation of Machu Picchu, playing a very crucial role in limiting its commercial
exploitation.
Also the World Bank is collaborating with the government of Peru since 2005 in the
Vilcanota Valley Rehabilitation Project. In this framework the Bank accorded a loan of
US$8 million to the Government of Peru (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Tourism)
for a four-year period and is coordinating the implementation of a large number of
interventions in the whole Vilcanota Valley where the HSM is located.
Train Cusco-Machu Picchu return
96-132 Various options
Bus From Aguas Calientes to Machu Picchu (6 km)
9 Foreigners
6 National population
2 Local population
Fees Entrance to the Inca City of Machu Picchu
40 Foreign adult ticket
20 Foreign student
20 Peruvian adult
10 Peruvian student
Table I.
Visitors expenditure to
visit Machu Picchu
(2007 data, US$)
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3. INC-Cusco: the underlying business model
Though our main interest is the managing of the HSM as such, a focus on
INC-Cusco – the entity in charge of heritage protection in the region, both tangible and
intangible, one of the richest areas of Peru – is indispensible, for two main reasons:
. in organizational terms, the Archaeological Park of Machu Picchu is not a “stand
alone” institution, but rather an internal division of INC-Cusco. Several elements
of its functioning are thus defined by the higher level of the organization; and
. most importantly, in financial terms the relationship between the two entities is
crucial for understanding the “business model,” the inner economy of heritage in
the area and in Machu Picchu: where money comes from, where it is are used,
and important elements of internal cross-subsidization, as in any organization.
Interestingly enough, a precise reconstruction of financial flows as in Figure 2
was not available to either UNESCO and the World Bank during the Vilcanota
project.
3.1 Internal structure and scope
INC-Cusco is a very complex organization, a sort of portfolio of individual entities,
tasks, and departments that are related to the great number of archaeological
sites in the region. In addition to HSM, it directly manages several important
sites (Museo de Sitio de Machu Picchu, Museo de Sitio de Chinchero, Tipon, Tarawasi,
Raqchi, Moray, Pikillaqta, Choquequirao, Huchuy Qosqo), plus the sites in the
Sacred Valley and surrounding Cusco city that are managed by the municipality using
human resources and competences of INC-Cusco (including Pisaq, Chinchero,
Ollantaytambo, Saqsaywaman, Q’enqo, Puka Pukara, and Tambomachay). In
addition, other internal departments are associated to major projects (Cusco’s
historical centre, another UNESCO site, the Qhapaq N˜an project, etc.), as well as
internal offices (Figure 2).
Figure 2.
Instituto Nacional de
Cultura del Cusco
(INC-Cusco),
organizational chart
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Following the general wave of decentralization in the country as a whole, in 2003 INC-
Cusco gained a new, special status of autonomy[3]. While the actual degree of
decentralization is often questioned by inner actors (the same law indeed explains that
INC-Cusco “maintains its condition of decisional unit”) there are important impacts of
the general process of transformation affecting any organizational analysis,
particularly in terms of financial and human resource management.
3.2 Tickets and inflows
A crucial aspect in the management of heritage in Cusco must be underlined: money
from tickets in the area is kept at the local level, and furthermore the area is almost
totally self-funded. Just marginal amounts are transferred through the national
budgeting procedure (in 2007, 1 out of 82.5 million Soles of total inflows – 1 Soles equal
h0.272). An exception is represented by sites run in cooperation with Oficina Ejecutiva
del Cusco (OFEC , an entity run by the municipality), where INC-Cusco simply get a
portion of revenues from OFEC. Some general inflows are also present.
From a substantive point of view some comments on inflows can be pointed out
based on the situation in 2007 (Table II):
. the Inca City of Machu Picchu (70.6 percent) and Inca Trail (17.5 percent) account
for 88 percent of total inflows of the whole area;
. the sites managed through OFEC have some financial importance (10 percent),
though the rules governing the distribution of margins between the municipality
and INC-Cusco are a subject of controversy; and
. the rest of the heritage directly managed – though important from an historical
and archaeological point of view – have a very marginal impact in terms of
inflow (1.3 percent), as well as other inflows (0.7 percent).
In terms of dynamics (Figure 3), sustained growth can be found: in 2007 inflows at
Machu Picchu were almost four times the value in 2002 and seven times those of 1999.
Although there has been considerable inflation, trends in ticket inflows show a
dramatic explosion in visitor numbers, combined with an increase in the ticket price to
enter Machu Picchu. In particular, the number of visitors has doubled in the last seven
years, to the impressive number of 800,000 in 2007.
Such a trend in visitors is a crucial element in the whole discourse about managing
Machu Picchu, directly linked to the delicate trade-offs between exploitation and
conservation of the site:
. One of the most interesting elements to be noted (Figure 3) is that not all inflows
are kept by INC-Cusco as such. Indeed the Municipality of Aguas Calientes has
received 10 percent of entrance fees from Machu Picchu since 2004. The history
of how this decision was made deserves a paper of its own. Of the remaining real
captado (income before transfers) of 81.5 million Soles, 70 percent is kept by
INC-Cusco as a whole, 15 percent is redirected to the Qhapaq N˜an project in
Cusco, and 15 to the Qhapaq N˜an project in Lima.
. An explosion of visitor numbers also emerges – which is perceived as a threat to
the preservation of the site by international experts, UNESCO in particular. The
seasonal breakdown of data (Table III) shows that in peak months about 90,000
people visit the sites: an average of 3,000 per day, well above the 2,500 level
established by the plan itself.
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3.3 Financial performance
As mentioned, within a general effort to fight corruption, a system for controlling the
destination of public expenditure (SNIP) has been gradually introduced by law in Peru
since 2000. This represents another important reform in a logic of the modernization of
the State (see box 2 in the virtual appendix). In 2003 the system was applied to cultural
heritage and to INC as well.
In procedural terms, this had a rather unusual impact on accounting representation.
According to a long-standing tradition, costs are divided in three different classes:
administrative, operating (actividad), and investment (inversiones). Any project of
refurbishment, restoration, or conservation for INC-Cusco is defined as “investment,”
and thus has to follow the national SNIP application. One could argue that from a
managerial point of view, conservation and restoration are simply current, typical
activities of this type of organization, and indeed should be seen as ordinary routines
(and thus current costs). However, national priorities, first of all fighting corruption,
have their rationality (and anyway the strength to impose their agenda), and thus such
a distinction must be accepted. Unfortunately, this impacts normal accounting tools, to
a large extent reducing transparency for the external reader of financial statement. In
the Estado de Gestio´n (income and expenditure statement) report, only current
costs are listed, while all inversiones – though carefully tracked by the cost accounting
system – are capitalized as assets in the balance sheet. As a result, the income
statement is useless for analyzing the uses of resources. For instance, in 2007, with 82.5
million soles of income, 26.2 million in costs and expenditures were listed, leaving an
operating margin of 56.3 million. Considering other inflows and expenditures, a net
result of 53.3 million is presented (64 percent!), which would be wrong to compare to
the notion of surplus in any other accounting system.
The external reader would have serious problem in relating these numbers to actual
financial dynamics. Fortunately, we were provided data from the internal costing
systems (Table IV), addressing important phenomena:
. Almost half of total gastos (expenditures) (41.7 million) are for current activities
(51.4 percent), while 10.6 percent are for administrative expenditures, and
37.9 percent for inversiones.
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. In terms of type, total expenditures can also be divided in terms of salaries for
full time employees (6.6 percent); salary for ad hoc, temporary personnel
employed in both administrative and operational activities (27.9 percent); salary
for personnel employed on investment projects (24.9 percent), and good and
services purchased (40.6 percent). While the total amount of salary per se is not
surprising, what is really unusual is the limited role of salary of “normal”
employed, as we will see looking at HR management.
The rate of growth in administrative and operating expenditures appears to be higher
than growth in investment, especially in recent years (Figure 4). Despite the large
amounts available, the implementation of SNIP procedures within the INC in recent
years – and particularly from 2005, following the establishment of the new Plan
Maestro – show a decline in ready investment projects, due to delayed approval by the
SNIP offices. In other words, the crucial underlying process of redirecting managerial
attention to a new set of investments, which was shaped within the new plan and made
possible by the new resources created by the increase in visitor inflows, is hidden by
the parallel phenomenon of a new, complex national accounting procedure, the SNIP.
3.4 Human resources
One of the most difficult things to understand in any context is the question of human
resources. Though deeply embedded in social and historical traditions, and especially
in the public sector subject to different countries’ idiosyncratic processes of change or
inertia, human resources are, however, a crucial variable. Management, in heritage as
elsewhere, is basically an issue of managing people.
No civil servants have been hired in Peru since 1991, under a general rule
established by then President Alberto Fujimori. The result has been a massive use of
contract workers to an extent rarely seen elsewhere. Out of 2,751 people currently
working at INC-Cusco, only 123 are full time employees. The rest are on contract,
with a variety of solutions for the 1,203 people working on administrative and
operating activities, even including skilled workers and responsibility managerial
positions.
Furthermore, on a strictly project basis the remainder work on investment projects,
including directive staff and project managers (80) and workers (1,345), always hired
with short term contracts (visiting a site in Cusco at the beginning of June, we saw
groups of workers waiting a for job call, echoing the movie “On the Waterfront”).
To what extent such a situation is peculiar to INC-Cusco compared to the rest of the
public sector in Peru is an open question (for health care and education Jumpa et al.,
2003, do not acknowledge a similar situation, but rather practices of “double jobs”,
Expenditures for administration, activities and investments
0
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20,000,000
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i.e. doing two jobs at a time). Maybe part of this anomaly is the rich financial situation
(and its dynamics in recent years) that allow a significant increase in the number of
staff (funding additional jobs, but just in terms of contract positions).
In any case, this seems to put the overall managerial problem in very different terms
compared with the rest of the world. While usually the issue is trying to find new forms
of development to increase public sector productivity through outsourcing, governance
reforms, incentive mechanism and the like, if not privatization initiatives, here the
workforce seems to be “manageable” as is rarely the case. Indeed, one could argue,
such a situation actually presents risks in terms of the economics of job relations, by
negating the economic underpinnings of long-term worker relationships (a la
Williamson, 1985).
Looking at the distribution of people in the organizational chart (not including
people working on investment projects), interesting elements can be noticed (Table V).
Out of the 1,326 people working in administration and operations, about 10 percent
(152) work at the top management and central staff, including administration. A very
small portion works at the Direction of Cultural promotion (30), while a large number
(1,085) work at the Direction of Patrimonio Historico (one can see the effort that the
preservation on heritage in the different sites is calling for). Interesting enough, only
186 people work directly at Machu Picchu (where, in addition, other staff from Inrena
also work).
3.5 The financial business model and unforeseen developments
Following this description, an insight on the business model of INC-Cusco can be
pointed out:
. Basically, it is a almost totally self-funded entity, which can use resources from
visitors to cover all its expenditures: running costs, labor (though on contract),
and investment.
. In terms of internal cross-subsidizing, the most profitable sites (the Inca City of
Machu Picchu) are largely funding the entire preservation, restoration, and
operation of the region (despite some contributions by the major sites managed
by OFEC).
. In terms of dynamics, the impression is that this was to some extent an
unforeseen process of development. In particular, the new status after the 2003
reform, the adoption of the new Master Plan in 2005, the establishment of SNIP
logic since 2003 and with reference to the various projects of Plan Maestro, all
coupled with the increase in the number of visitors – particularly in Machu
Picchu: þ 74 percent from 2002 – made such a “business model” extremely
lucrative for all parties. Even though there are very negative aspects at work, it
has been used to a large extend to fund the whole area. No doubt risk remains, as
well as externalities that need to be addressed (the visitor pressure criticized by
UNESCO, and profits “donated” to private sector rather than used for the sites
and archaeological purposes).
4. Change processes and the master plans
The issue of planning has become crucial in running the HSM in the last
decade. Inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage list in 1983 required the adoption
of management tools and the creation of a management unit in charge of the
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overall administration of the site. However, in the HSM only sporadic conservation
interventions were taken without any logic of coordination, until very recently.
Since 1996 UNESCO has pressured the Peruvian government to adopt adequate
management arrangements and comprehensive master planning for the HSM.
Therefore in the late 1990s the Peruvian Government and the institutions involved in
the management of the HSM gradually started a process of formulation, adoption, and
implementation of specific management tools: this marked the beginning of a culture of
“managing by plans.”
TwoMaster Plans covering a time range of ten years have been applied so far: one in
1998 (soon abandoned), and one in 2005 (under implementation). The first Master Plan
(see box 3 of the appendix ) was required by UNESCO and realized in a top-down
fashion by a small team of four external consultants with little involvement of
professionals from the local institutions in charge of site management. Indeed,
criticisms from the international community (UNESCO and ICOMOS) have been severe
on the genericism and lack of operational character of the Plan, also complaining that
the strategic planning contents of the document hid implicit strategies and goals
(in particular, speculative and political interests concerning the exploitation of tourism
flows: e.g., a cableway project to enhance the access to the Sanctuary, regardless of
environmental impacts).
Permanent SNP Recibo Total
Regional direction, institutional affairs, secretary general, etc. 5 15 4 24
Legal affairs, cooperation, and planning 4 16 3 23
Staff supervuision, documentation, and acrchives 11 10 3 24
Administration 16 50 15 81
Total top level 36 91 25 152
Direction conservation of immobile heritage 1 1
Museums 11 26 45 82
Regional investigations 8 43 44 95
Cusco centro historic 4 15 0 19
Archeological parks 7 115 272 394
Qhapag Nan 2 37 41 80
Machu Picchu archeological park 5 147 34 186
Sacsayhuaman 6 22 57 85
Studies and projects 5 41 22 68
Subdirection movable heritage 3 35 37 75
Total historical heritage 52 481 552 1,085
Production and cultural development 4 8 12
Culturale events promotion 5 9 14
INC-UNESCO agreement on living culture 1 1
Activity and research of entodevelopment 1 2 3
Total cultural promotion 4 15 11 30
Total 1 92 587 588 1,267
Subdirection of works 8 3 0 11
Others 23 7 18 48
Total 2 (Non-including workers on investments projects) 123 597 606 1,326
Workers for investment projects 2008 for the
sub-direction of works 80
Workers 2008 1,345
2,751
Table V.
Staffing at INC Cusco
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The second Master Plan (2005) originated from the failure of the previous one, in a
context of strong criticism and insistence by UNESCO for the adoption of a new
management plan (see box 4 of the appendix). The Plan extensively focuses (one-third
of the document) on reviewing the cultural, historical, political, and legislative context
of Machu Picchu; the definition of a vision, goals, settings, and strategies are based on
this professional understanding. Prior attention is given to the archaeological/
professional dimension; the enhancement of the sacred value of the site, beside the
world recognized cultural and natural value; the UNESCO normative framework,
beside the national legislation; organizational issues and, particularly, inter-
institutional coordination. Minor attention is given to issues concerning tourism
exploitation and to the economic value of the site. Interestingly, no attention at all is
given to the problem of Aguas Calientes.
In this case the formal planning/goal-setting exercise does not derive from a static,
ahistorical, acontextual analysis (the conventional analysis of gaps between an extant
situation and a ideal/target situation, in terms of fit between internal resources and
external requirements). On the contrary, both the external environment and the
Sanctuary itself are presented through a historical and cultural reconstruction of the
different logics of action and the different interests and conflicts involved. Hence in this
case the Plan seems to be a locus of programming actions and decisions (the last three
chapters), but on the base of a deep, prior understanding of the historical, process-
informed, contextual meaning, and specificities of a site (the first five chapters).
The 2005 Master Plan can be considered as an operational management tool: despite
few inconsistencies, in its detailed tables the hierarchy of objectives, strategies,
and specific projects is coupled with timing, allocation of resources, and indication of the
funding source at each level (Table VI). Moreover, as we directly observed on site, the
Plan Maestro 2005 is a strong reference in the daily practices of administrative, and also
professional personnel of HSM (archaeologists, architects, anthropologists). The Plan is
widely used as the framework through which they organize their activities, coordinate
with other processes, and at the same time make sense of their contributions in a logic of
integrated action. Indeed, archaeologists in HSM seem to trust in the Plan Maestro 2005.
At all the meetings we had, people were coming with their own copy of the Plan,
constantly referring to it: a sort of symbol of “archaeological pride,” which was
recovering after Fujimori’s exploitation of the site.
Although most of the 2005 Plan clearly takes into account concerns by the
international community, two elements represent a sort of weakness in the overall
picture provided:
. the total lack or reference to the issue of Aguas Calientes: one of the major
preoccupations of UNESCO is very rarely referred to, nor is the issue of urban
planning addressed adequately. On a crucial issue, the plan is silent; and
. the generous attitude in defining the number of maximum visitors per day, 2,500:
a number itself criticized, that can lead up to annual capacity of 912,500 visitors
(Instituto Nacional de Cultura (Direccion Regional de Cultura Cusco), Instituto de
Recursos Naturale, 2005, p. 96), i.e. a projection bigger than actual figures in
recent years. Such a number is more than problematic given the alleged
emphasis on the spiritual meaning of the site (it is hard to enjoy the sacred value
when you cannot stop more than ten minutes in any one place, in order to keep
traffic moving). Put simply, such a mass exploitation seems to be incompatible
with high quality and intense enjoyment of the site.
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All in all, the role of the Plan seems to have deeply transformed: from the use
of the Plan as a ritualistic/political requirement to its use of a managerial instrument,
to address attention, set priorities, coordinate flows of actions. Moreover, the
importance attributed to Plans has changed (e.g. in the number of people involved
in their formulation, in the centrality given to the document, as attested in the
interviews).
Searching for major drivers of change, the emergence of master plan practices in
Machu Picchu has to be understood in the light of two macro changes in the cultural/
political context:
. the end of an era ruled by corruption, and the beginning of the “modernization”
process of the State after the Fujimori period; and
. the influence of the international community administrative culture: the
international community (public opinion in general, UNESCO, and World Bank
Sintesi Total (S) INC Inrena Otras
1 Authenticity and conservation 112,024,443 101,464,268 10,560,175
1. Identity and cultural
diffusion 3,457,552 3,457,552
2. Conservation and
restoration of archeological
sites 86,823,332 86,823,332
3. INCA trails – Qhapac Nan 3,566,600 3,566,600
4. Research studies 1,315,600 1,315,600
5. Registration and research
on cultural heritage 5,801,184 5,801,184
6. Museums 500,000 500,000
7. Conservation of the
biological diversity in the
HSM 10,560,175 0 10,560,175
2 Territoriality and public uses 188,901,006 1,140,000 5,063,225 182,697,781
1. Territorial planning 788,000 788,000
2. Sustainable use of natural
heritage 6,535,650 6,535,650
3. Disaster reduction 4,409,131 350,000 4,059,131
4. Accesses, transportation
and routes 171,315,000 171,315,000
5. Sustainable tourism 5,853,225 790,000 5,063,225
3 Management 14,248,341 2,394,391 11,853,950 0
1. General administration 2,067,391 2,067,391
2. General administration
INC-Inrena 11,970,950 222,000 11,748,950
3. Inter-institutional
coordination
INC-Inrena-UGM 210,000 105,000 105,000
Master plan investment plan 104,998,659 27,477,350
132,476,009
Complementary program 182,697,781
Total investments 315,173,790
US$ 95,507,209 31,817,775 8,326,470 55,362,964
Table VI.
Plan Maestro 2005:
Expenditures
and sources
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in particular) also played a central role. Interesting enough, this impact took
place at different levels: an overall impact in terms of general policy guidelines
(calling for a more curatorial/ecological kind of attitude as a whole), an impact on
specific solutions (e.g. fighting the idea of the cableway), and in terms of
methodologies that are used and transferred.
UNESCO seems to have played the role of supporting professional views which would
have been particularly weak in the absence of such a legitimating role. Most
archaeologists we met and talked with were in total agreement with what was asked
for/imposed by UNESCO. In a sense, UNESCO itself seems to have acted as giving
“voice” to an archaeology value-based view of the whole site. In any case, it acted as
support to strengthening the professional view. Moreover, the transference of planning
technologies was not a mere standard process: the way in which the plan is structured
and its rhetoric (e.g. the lack of a “normal” SWOT analysis in favor of a more
substantive analysis of specific issues), can be seen as an original way in which the
professional and the managerial dimensions are put in dialogue. It is a pity that in the
general debate – in formal documents and the press – the efforts of those fighting
“with” international calls for preservation is rarely addressed: finding friends and
enemies, acknowledging efforts of the former and responsibilities of the latter is crucial
in motivating people and mobilizing actions.
5. Concluding remarks
There are just few additional comments that the study of Machu Picchu can address, as
general concluding remarks. First, the socially constructed nature of archaeological
sites clearly emerges from this narrative. The meanings (De La Torre and MacLean,
2005) – and above all priorities and the ranking between various meanings – largely
differ in the two “eras” (Fujimori and post-Fujimori). Or, put in other words, the
meanings associated to a site like this cannot be taken for granted, as given.
Legitimizing views that are closer – or more compatible – with international values of
the profession is a crucial task of international agencies in such a delicate, conflicting
process of sense making.
Second, the embeddedness of heritage management in the public sector dynamics
clearly appears. It is impossible to talk about the management of Machu Picchu
without a huge “introduction,” which is indispensable in order to understand the
context (structure and changes in the bureaucracy and its internal design, human
resource issues, SNIP, and so on). Without such a huge introduction, any comment on
data (e.g. people, investments, achievements) would have been not only lacking
context, but largely misleading.
Third, rather than simplistic application of management tools to specific fields –
such as “site management” or “museum management” – what emerges is the inner
complexity of any discourse about management in itself. There are not shortcuts to
understand the complexity of the management of similar entities, the actual direction,
and impact of change processes, merits, and faults of different groups of actors
involved. Contextual and processual approaches require a careful use of management
studies knowledge. Investigating institutional settings, the underlying business model,
and actual managerial practices in planning is crucial for understanding the
management of similar entities.
Fourth, the Machu Picchu story gives a central role to the issue of institutional
design, as it is often the case (Zan 2006; Lusiani and Zan, 2010). Here a very problematic
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issue concerns the idea itself of governance structure brought in from a management
studies background (in a more or less conscious way):
. The underlying concept of “entity,” of organizations that are in themselves
responsible and self-contained, and thus accountable as such is still alien to most
public bureaucracies (not just in developing countries, but in continental
bureaucracies as well, as for instance Italy and most of its museums and
archaeological sites).
. The underlying assumption that – despite differences in speed and rate – the
tendency is a change toward better-defined organizational boundaries of
individual operating units (entities) can indeed be questioned, according to our
research. Doubt remains whether Machu Picchu, Pompeii, and many other
organizations in the cultural heritage sector inside public bodies seem to be
willing to move seriously in this direction.
. In any case, understanding the conflictual process of change of partial branches
of the public sector – such as museums and sites embedded in broader
administrative bodies – is necessary to avoid misunderstandings and costly
conflicts. The Unidad de Gestio´n suggested by UNESCO (and later on by the
World Bank) is indeed such a weak institutional solution, compared to what is
used elsewhere in similar contexts. For example, in funding the conservation of
Quito’s historical centre, the Inter-American Development Bank imposed the
establishment of a private law public agency with which all transactions and
decisions were taken, thus avoiding institutional fragmentation typical of public
sector (in Ecuador as elsewhere).
Fifth, Machu Picchu is an extraordinary rich archaeological site, different from most of
museums and sites in the world. Interestingly enough, serious problems can be found
also in this wealthy situation. There are problems in defining the meanings and
concept of the site, e.g. between commercial exploitation and the logic of protection,
problems in defining roles and tasks of public and private actors, and problems in
finding a possible “third way” between the radicalism of the neoliberal agenda (and the
excess of privatization during the 1990s) and the difficulties in making public sector
more effective, efficient, and accountable.
Differently from most public sector dynamics, and NPM reforms, here privatization
and outsourcing have gone too far, and there is an issue of recovering a (Weberian?)
bureaucracy. Ironically, even in such an anomalously rich context, the issue of
institutional setting, administrative norms, and above all, the issue of management,
become crucial.
Notes
1. Peru’s legislation has always been sensitive to cultural heritage preservation issues
(Ley 6439 in 1929); most recent references are the General Law for the Protection of the
National Cultural Heritage of 1985 (Ley 24047/1985), and the General Law for Cultural
Heritage of 2004 (Ley 28296/2004).
2. Ley no. 27658/2002, Ley Marco de la Modernizacion de la Gestio´n del Estado.
3. Decreto Supremo no. 017/2003 “Reglamento de organizacio´n y funciones del Instituto
Nacional de Cultura” in Normas Legales, 2003.
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